Spinoza Essay Research Paper This paper will free essay sample

Spinoza Essay, Research Paper This paper will sketch Spinoza s statement in Part 1 of his Ethical motives of substance. He argues that there is merely one substance, which is the same as God, that includes everything in the existence. It will walk through each proposition and explicate his cogent evidence of it, which relies of his declared definitions. This paper will besides explicate the difference between Spinoza s belief of substance and that of Leibniz from his Discourse on Metaphysics. It will so reason that Leibniz s history of the figure of substances superior. Spinoza s first proposition is that substance is by nature prior to its fondnesss ( Cahn p.417 ) . This proposition relies on his definition of a substance which is self created. The fondnesss of the substance, harmonizing to his definition, are things that are created by something else. Since the substance is self-created, the substance must hold created the fondnesss from itself. Therefore, the substance is prior to its fondnesss since the substance has to be in being to make its fondnesss. Proposition 2, two substances holding different properties have nil in common ( Cahn p.417 ) , besides relies on the definition that a substance is self-created. If one property of a substance is created from that substance, it belongs merely to that substance. Therefore, two different substances holding the same property are non different, but the same substance. If two substances are genuinely different, they have none of the same properties. If all the properties of the two substances are wholly different, they have nil in common. One thing, which is wholly different from the other, can non hold caused the other. This is true because something created must hold some cognition of its Godhead, as stated in Spinoza s axiom 4. Since the two different things have nil in common, which includes no cognition of the other, one can non hold created the other. Spinoza states this in proposition 3. When things have nil in common, one can non be the cause of the other ( Cahn p. 417 ) . He besi des reaffirms this in proposition 4 by saying that things are different by the fact of differences in their properties or fondnesss. This fact is seen easy by looking at the proofs beforehand of propositions 1,2, and 3. Proposition 5 and 6 restate earlier propositions in footings of substances, as opposed to things. Proposition 5 provinces: In the existence at that place can non be two or more substances of the same nature or property ( Cahn p.417 ) . Since two substances are distinguished by a difference in their properties or fondnesss ( proposition 4 ) , the substances would non be different from one another if the had the same property. The two substances would be the same. Proposition 6 provinces that One substance can non be produced by another substance ( Cahn p.417 ) . If a substance were to make another one, they would hold something in common such as an property. However, there can non be two substances with the same property ( proposition 5 ) , they must hold different properties and, hence, be different. If the substances are different, they have nil in common ( proposition 2 ) , and substances with nil in common on could non hold caused the other ( proposition3 ) . One substance can non make another. Spinoza has proved all this about a substance, but has non proved that substance exists. In proposition 7 he does: Existence belongs to the nature of substance ( Cahn p. 418 ) . He states that since substance is self-caused, being is needfully involved in it kernel, intending that being is portion of its nature. Now that substance exists, Spinoza proves it is infinite. He says that if substance were finite, it would be limited by another substance with the same property of being. But no two substances can hold the same property ( proposition 5 ) . Therefore, substance is infinite. Since Spinoza has proved that there is a alone, infinite substance that exists, he now goes on to turn out that the substance is God, merely one of which exists. He must first include some propositions, which will be used subsequently to assist turn out this point. He begins by turn outing that the more existent something is, the more properties it has ( proposition 9 ) . He feels that this proposition is apparent in the definition of an property: that which the mind perceives of substance as representing its being ( Cahn p.416 ) . The more world that is associated with the kernel of a substance the more properties it has because an property is what the mind perceives the kernel of the substance to be. The substance itself must gestate each of these properties ( proposition 10 ) . Harmonizing to definition 3, gestating a substance does non necessitate the construct of something else with which to organize the substance. Besides, gestating something is based on its kernel. Therefore, attributes used to gestate a substance must be conceived through itself. Now Spinoza proves that God exists in proposition 11: God, or substance consisting of infinite properties, each of which expresses ageless and infinite kernel, needfully exists ( Cahn p.419 ) . He easy proves this utilizing axiom 7: if a thing can be conceived as non bing, its kernel does non affect being ( Cahn p.416 ) . He says it is absurd to gestate God as nonexistent since being belongs to the nature of God, or substance ( proposition 7 ) . He besides says that there is no substance that can turn out that God does non be since two different substances have nil in common ( proposition 2 ) . Therefore, God exists. Now that Spinoza has proved that the infinite substance of God exists, he proves that substance can non be divided in proposition 12. He that if it were divided, each portion would be infinite, self-caused, and would hold to hold different properties, doing several different substances to be caused from the one substance which is impossible because no substance can be caused from another ( proposition 6 ) . Proposition affirms that an perfectly infinite substance is indivisible ( Cahn p.421 ) . It is impossible to split an perfectly infinite substance because several substances would be with the same properties, which is impossible harmonizing to proposition 5. Spinoza now proves proposition 14 ; that no other substance other than God exists. Since God is an perfectly infinite being, any other existing substance would hold to exhibit an property of God. This is impossible because no two substances can be with the same property ( proposition 5 ) . Being is an property of God ; hence no other substance can be. Leibniz s place on substance differs form that of Spinoza in the figure of substances. Leibniz does non believe in one substance, but in many substances, or as he calls them monads. He believes that everything is made up of monads with their ain properties. These monads are in harmoniousness throughout the existence, neer coming in contact. He believes that anything thing that consists of monads with the same properties are non different, but the same, similar to the belief of Spinoza. The lone difference is the figure of substances. Leibniz s history of the figure of substances is superior. The many monads, each with its ain properties, allows for the many different things in the existence to be. Since everything does non hold all the same monads, they can be different. A Canis familiaris and a stone are evidently non the same. They are non the same because they are composed of monads with different properties. If they did consist of the same monads, they would be the same, and they evidently are non. Harmonizing to Spinoza, God is the lone substance. Everything we know is portion of God. God includes all properties. If I am portion of God, I contain all properties. However, I do non incorporate all properties. There are many that I do non include such and eternity. I am evidently non infinite. Leibniz s history of the figure of substances allows me to be, non incorporating every property. Bibliography Cahn, Stephen M. , ed. , Classics of Western Philosophy ( Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. , 1999 ) 416-421. This paper will sketch Spinoza s statement in Part 1 of his Ethical motives of substance. He argues that there is merely one substance, which is the same as God, that includes everything in the existence. It will walk through each proposition and explicate his cogent evidence of it, which relies of his declared definitions. This paper will besides explicate the difference between Spinoza s belief of substance and that of Leibniz from his Discourse on Metaphysics. It will so reason that Leibniz s history of the figure of substances superior. Spinoza s first proposition is that substance is by nature prior to its fondnesss ( Cahn p.417 ) . This proposition relies on his definition of a substance which is self created. The fondnesss of the substance, harmonizing to his definition, are things that are created by something else. Since the substance is self-created, the substance must hold created the fondnesss from itself. Therefore, the substance is prior to its fondnesss since the substance has to be in being to make its fondnesss. Proposition 2, two substances holding different properties have nil in common ( Cahn p.417 ) , besides relies on the definition that a substance is self-created. If one property of a substance is created from that substance, it belongs merely to that substance. Therefore, two different substances holding the same property are non different, but the same substance. If two substances are genuinely different, they have none of the same properties. If all the properties of the two substances are wholly different, they have nil in common. One thing, which is wholly different from the other, can non hold caused the other. This is true because something created must hold some cognition of its Godhead, as stated in Spinoza s axiom 4. Since the two different things have nil in common, which includes no cognition of the other, one can non hold created the other. Spinoza states this in proposition 3. When things have nil in common, one can non be the cause of the other ( Cahn p. 417 ) . He besi des reaffirms this in proposition 4 by saying that things are different by the fact of differences in their properties or fondnesss. This fact is seen easy by looking at the proofs beforehand of propositions 1,2, and 3. Proposition 5 and 6 restate earlier propositions in footings of substances, as opposed to things. Proposition 5 provinces: In the existence at that place can non be two or more substances of the same nature or property ( Cahn p.417 ) . Since two substances are distinguished by a difference in their properties or fondnesss ( proposition 4 ) , the substances would non be different from one another if the had the same property. The two substances would be the same. Proposition 6 provinces that One substance can non be produced by another substance ( Cahn p.417 ) . If a substance were to make another one, they would hold something in common such as an property. However, there can non be two substances with the same property ( proposition 5 ) , they must hold different properties and, hence, be different. If the substances are different, they have nil in common ( proposition 2 ) , and substances with nil in common on could non hold caused the other ( proposition3 ) . One substance can non make another. Spinoza has proved all this about a substance, but has non proved that substance exists. In proposition 7 he does: Existence belongs to the nature of substance ( Cahn p. 418 ) . He states that since substance is self-caused, being is needfully involved in it kernel, intending that being is portion of its nature. Now that substance exists, Spinoza proves it is infinite. He says that if substance were finite, it would be limited by another substance with the same property of being. But no two substances can hold the same property ( proposition 5 ) . Therefore, substance is infinite. Since Spinoza has proved that there is a alone, infinite substance that exists, he now goes on to turn out that the substance is God, merely one of which exists. He must first include some propositions, which will be used subsequently to assist turn out this point. He begins by turn outing that the more existent something is, the more properties it has ( proposition 9 ) . He feels that this proposition is apparent in the definition of an property: that which the mind perceives of substance as representing its being ( Cahn p.416 ) . The more world that is associated with the kernel of a substance the more properties it has because an property is what the mind perceives the kernel of the substance to be. The substance itself must gestate each of these properties ( proposition 10 ) . Harmonizing to definition 3, gestating a substance does non necessitate the construct of something else with which to organize the substance. Besides, gestating something is based on its kernel. Therefore, attributes used to gestate a substance must be conceived through itself. Now Spinoza proves that God exists in proposition 11: God, or substance consisting of infinite properties, each of which expresses ageless and infinite kernel, needfully exists ( Cahn p.419 ) . He easy proves this utilizing axiom 7: if a thing can be conceived as non bing, its kernel does non affect being ( Cahn p.416 ) . He says it is absurd to gestate God as nonexistent since being belongs to the nature of God, or substance ( proposition 7 ) . He besides says that there is no substance that can turn out that God does non be since two different substances have nil in common ( proposition 2 ) . Therefore, God exists. Now that Spinoza has proved that the infinite substance of God exists, he proves that substance can non be divided in proposition 12. He that if it were divided, each portion would be infinite, self-caused, and would hold to hold different properties, doing several different substances to be caused from the one substance which is impossible because no substance can be caused from another ( proposition 6 ) . Proposition affirms that an perfectly infinite substance is indivisible ( Cahn p.421 ) . It is impossible to split an perfectly infinite substance because several substances would be with the same properties, which is impossible harmonizing to proposition 5. Spinoza now proves proposition 14 ; that no other substance other than God exists. Since God is an perfectly infinite being, any other existing substance would hold to exhibit an property of God. This is impossible because no two substances can be with the same property ( proposition 5 ) . Being is an property of God ; hence no other substance can be. Leibniz s place on substance differs form that of Spinoza in the figure of substances. Leibniz does non believe in one substance, but in many substances, or as he calls them monads. He believes that everything is made up of monads with their ain properties. These monads are in harmoniousness throughout the existence, neer coming in contact. He believes that anything thing that consists of monads with the same properties are non different, but the same, similar to the belief of Spinoza. The lone difference is the figure of substances. Leibniz s history of the figure of substances is superior. The many monads, each with its ain properties, allows for the many different things in the existence to be. Since everything does non hold all the same monads, they can be different. A Canis familiaris and a stone are evidently non the same. They are non the same because they are composed of monads with different properties. If they did consist of the same monads, they would be the same, and they evidently are non. Harmonizing to Spinoza, God is the lone substance. Everything we know is portion of God. God includes all properties. If I am portion of God, I contain all properties. However, I do non incorporate all properties. There are many that I do non include such and eternity. I am evidently non infinite. Leibniz s history of the figure of substances allows me to be, non incorporating every property. Bibliography Cahn, Stephen M. , ed. , Classics of Western Philosophy ( Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. , 1999 ) 416-421.